Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/53140 
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dc.contributor.authorEndres, Alfreden
dc.contributor.authorFriehe, Timen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-01-
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T12:18:36Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T12:18:36Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53140-
dc.description.abstractThis paper analyzes the output, abatement, and investment decisions made by a monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law. The model applied considers both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies. We find that in the case of fixed technology, in many instances negligence produces more favorable results than strict liability in terms of social welfare. The reason is that output under strict liability is always less than first-best output, whereas output under negligence is not similarly limited. However, this ranking of liability rules may be reversed when technology is endogenous. Under such conditions investment in both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies under negligence is guided by motives foreign to the social planner, whereas the polluter's calculus under strict liability is similar to that of the social planner.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3649en
dc.subject.jelK13en
dc.subject.jelQ58en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.titleThe monopolistic polluter under environmental liability law: Incentives for abatement and R&D-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn675946263en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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