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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5844
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper assesses the effect of two stylized and antithetic non-monetary incentive schemes on students' effort. We collect data from a field experiment where incentives are exogenously imposed, performance is monitored and individual characteristics are observed. Students are randomly assigned to a tournament scheme that fosters competition between coupled students, a cooperative scheme that promotes information sharing and collaboration between students and a control treatment in which students can neither compete, nor cooperate. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that competition induces higher effort with respect to cooperation and cooperation does not increase effort with respect to the baseline. However, this is true only for men, while women do not seem to react to non-monetary incentives.
Schlagwörter: 
education
field experiments
incentives
competition
cooperation
JEL: 
A22
C93
I20
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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