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https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-Feld | Wert | Sprache |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Sieg, Gernot | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2010-04-14 | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2011-11-14T17:10:54Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2011-11-14T17:10:54Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2009 | - |
dc.identifier.pi | urn:nbn:de:gbv:084-24464 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51313 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Grandfather rights are currently used in the European Union to allocate airport slots. This article shows that airports prefer such a use-it-or-lose-it rule to unconditional property rights. Assuming that there are informational asymmetries between airports and air carriers because air carriers have better information on passenger demand, the use-it-or-lose-it rule increases slot use when demand for air transport is low. Airport prots increase and those of the air carriers, together with social welfare, decrease. The prot-maximizing rule is a use-it- g < 1-or-lose-it rule. | en |
dc.language.iso | eng | en |
dc.publisher | |aTechnische Universität Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cBraunschweig | en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries | |aEconomics Department Working Paper Series |x4 | en |
dc.subject.jel | L93 | en |
dc.subject.jel | R48 | en |
dc.subject.jel | D42 | en |
dc.subject.ddc | 330 | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Airports | en |
dc.subject.keyword | Grandfather rights | en |
dc.subject.keyword | use-it-or-lose-it rule | en |
dc.subject.keyword | airport slots | en |
dc.title | Grandfather rights in the market for airport slots | - |
dc.type | Working Paper | en |
dc.identifier.ppn | 594725747 | en |
dc.rights | http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen | en |
dc.identifier.repec | RePEc:zbw:tbswps:4 | en |
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