Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49920 
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dc.contributor.authorSchöb, Ronnieen
dc.contributor.authorThum, Marcelen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-23-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-27T16:12:36Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-27T16:12:36Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49920-
dc.description.abstractIndividual labour productivities are often unobservable for firms when hiring new workers. Job protection may prevent firms ex post from using information about labour productivities. We show that a binding minimum wage introduced in the presence of job protection will lead to lower unemployment levels than predicted by the standard labour market model with heterogeneous labour and full information.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFreie Universität Berlin, Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaft |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiskussionsbeiträge |x2011/14en
dc.subject.jelJ2en
dc.subject.jelJ3en
dc.subject.jelH5en
dc.subject.jelL5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMinimum wagesen
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten
dc.subject.keywordhidden informationen
dc.subject.keywordlabour market regulationen
dc.titleJob protection renders minimum wages less harmful-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn668790776en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:fubsbe:201114en

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