Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/49676 
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dc.contributor.authorDrouvelis, Michalisen
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Wielanden
dc.contributor.authorPossajennikov, Alexen
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:09Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:09Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49676-
dc.description.abstractThe common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender's type, the long-run behavior without an induced common prior is shown to be different from the behavior when a common prior is induced, while for other distributions behavior is similar under both regimes. We also present a learning model that allows players to learn about the other players' strategies and the prior distribution of the sender's type. We show that this learning model accurately accounts for all main features of the data.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2009-08en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcommon prioren
dc.subject.keywordsignalingen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.keywordlearningen
dc.subject.stwSignallingen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwStatistische Verteilungen
dc.subject.stwLernenen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleSignaling without common prior: An experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn598708367en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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