Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/48485 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers No. 14
Verlag: 
University of Würzburg, Department of Economics, Würzburg
Zusammenfassung: 
We develop an institutional framework for central banks that try to pursue a stability-oriented monetary policy in open-economies by directly targeting the exchange rate. Our main intention is to design a framework which avoids excessive capital inflows that can be regarded as a main cause of the crises in Asia, Latin America, Eastern and Central Europe and of the ERM I. In an open economy policy makers can target two interrelated variables: the interest rate and the exchange rate. These two operating target have to fulfil two different conditions. On the one hand they have to create monetary conditions that are consistent with the domestic economic situation. On the other hand they have to be compatible with a risk-premium adjusted uncovered interest parity condition (UIP). It is obvious that both conditions are difficult to met. In our view sustained violations of the second condition provide an important explanation for the problem of speculative capital inflows under a fixed nominal peg. We show that an adjustable nominal peg is in most cases a better solution to the dual requirement of UIP and adequate monetary conditions. This leads to a new solution for the inconsistency triangle: a central bank can combine an autonomous domestic interest rate policy with capital mobility and a floor for the target path of the exchange rate.
Schlagwörter: 
emerging market economies
exchange rate targeting
open-economy Taylor rule
UIP
risk premium
monetary conditions index
sterilised intervention, inconsistency triangle
JEL: 
F33
F36
F41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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