Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/48472
Authors: 
Schulz, Norbert
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Würzburg economic papers 25
Abstract: 
In an oligopoly model with switching costs firms have no incentive to discriminate by price (third degree), if the environment is symmetric. This is partly due to the fact that prices decrease unambiguously with price discrimination. In an asymmetric environment a firm enjoying some advantage may well have an incentive to discriminate. In all cases price discrimination increases social surplus. The antitrust treatment of price discrimination thus has to be questioned.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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