Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/46451 
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dc.contributor.authorBrekke, Kurt R.en
dc.contributor.authorHolmås, Tor Helgeen
dc.contributor.authorStraume, Odd Runeen
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-13-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:19:22Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:19:22Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46451-
dc.description.abstractWe study the impact of regulation on competition between brand-names and generics and pharmaceutical expenditures using a unique policy experiment in Norway, where reference pricing (RP) replaced price cap regulation in 2003 for a sub-sample of off-patent products. First, we construct a vertical differentiation model to analyze the impact of regulation on prices and market shares of brand-names and generics. Then, we exploit a detailed panel data set at product level covering several off-patent molecules before and after the policy reform. Off-patent drugs not subject to RP serve as our control group. We find that RP significantly reduces both brand-name and generic prices, and results in significantly lower brand-name market shares. Finally, we show that RP has a strong negative effect on average molecule prices, suggesting significant cost-savings, and that patients' copayments decrease despite the extra surcharges under RP.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3258en
dc.subject.jelI11en
dc.subject.jelI18en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL65en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpharmaceuticalsen
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.keywordgeneric competitionen
dc.subject.stwPharmazeutisches Produkten
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Preispolitiken
dc.subject.stwPreiswettbewerben
dc.subject.stwProduktdifferenzierungen
dc.subject.stwGenerikaen
dc.subject.stwGesundheitskostenen
dc.subject.stwNorwegenen
dc.titleReference pricing, competition, and pharmaceutical expenditures: Theory and evidence from a natural experiment-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn641609000en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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