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dc.contributor.authorHielscher, Kaien
dc.contributor.authorMarkwardt, Guntheren
dc.date.accessioned2011-05-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-06-29T11:14:24Z-
dc.date.available2011-06-29T11:14:24Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/46266-
dc.description.abstractThis paper empirically studies the impact of the quality of political institutions on the link between central bank independence and inflation. Making use of data on the evolution of central bank independence over time and controlling for possible nonlinearities, we employ interaction models to identify the conditions under which more central bank independence will enhance a country's inflation performance. Examining a cross-section of up to 69 countries, we are able to show that granting a central bank more autonomy does not necessarily lead to better inflation performance. To lower inflation by increasing independence, two conditions must be fulfilled: (1) The change in independence must be sufficiently large, and (2) the quality of the political institutions must be sufficiently high.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3396en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.jelE02en
dc.subject.jelE31en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcentral bank independenceen
dc.subject.keywordinflationen
dc.subject.keywordinstitutional qualityen
dc.subject.keywordmonetary policyen
dc.subject.stwInflationen
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitiken
dc.subject.stwZentralbankautonomieen
dc.subject.stwInstitutionelle Infrastrukturen
dc.subject.stwPolitische Stabilitäten
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleThe role of political institutions for the effectiveness of central bank independence-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn660155508en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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