Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44455 
Full metadata record
DC FieldValueLanguage
dc.contributor.authorKlein, Gordon J.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-02-04-
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-14T15:33:15Z-
dc.date.available2011-03-14T15:33:15Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44455-
dc.description.abstractLeniency programs as a tool for cartel detection and cartel destabilization, have been implemented since the early nineties. Theoretical work has shown that leniency programs can be effective in enhancing cartel detection and deterrence, but these effects are not straight-forward. It is even possible that there is an increase in the total number of cartels. Empirical evidence shows that the positive effect on cartel deterrence seems to dominate, but cannot provide definite evidence, as inference is derived only by detected cartels. This study uses a more direct measure of success, the intensity of competition at the industry level of OECD countries. An instrumental variable approach, reveals a positive effect on industries' competition intensity of leniency programs indicating effectiveness in cartel destabilization and effective deterrence.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aZentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW) |cMannheimen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aZEW Discussion Papers |x10-107en
dc.subject.jelC23en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.jelL41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCartelen
dc.subject.keywordAntitrusten
dc.subject.keywordLeniency Programen
dc.titleCartel destabilization and leniency programs: Empirical evidence-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn645296945en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:zewdip:10107en

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.