Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/44432 
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dc.contributor.authorde Carvalho Andrade, Eduardoen
dc.contributor.authorde Castro, Luciano I.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-27-
dc.date.accessioned2011-03-09T09:01:27Z-
dc.date.available2011-03-09T09:01:27Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/44432-
dc.description.abstractA parallel of education with transformative processes in standard markets suggest that a more severe control of the quality of the output will improve the overall quality of the education. This paper shows a somehow counterintuitive result: an increase in the exam difficulty may reduce the average quality (productivity) of selected individuals. Since the exam does not verify all skills, when its standard rises, candidates with relatively low skills emphasized in the test and high skills demanded in the job may no longer qualify. Hence, an increase in the testing standard may be counterproductive. One implication is that policies should emphasize alignment between the skills tested and those required in the actual jobs, rather than increase exams' difficulties.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW) |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Discussion Papers |x2011-2en
dc.subject.jelI2en
dc.subject.jelJ24en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordschool standardsen
dc.subject.keywordsignaling modelen
dc.subject.keywordcognitive skillsen
dc.subject.keywordnon-cognitive skillsen
dc.titleTougher educational exam leading to worse selection-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn644788879en
dc.rights.licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/de/deed.enen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:ifwedp:20112en

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