Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43765
Authors: 
Sung, Shao Chin
Dimitrov, Dinko
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working papers // Institute of Mathematical Economics 373
Abstract: 
We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.
Subjects: 
Coalition formation
Hedonic games
Separability
Taxonomy
JEL: 
C71
A14
D20
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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