Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43760 
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dc.contributor.authorBuechel, Bernoen
dc.contributor.authorHellmann, Timen
dc.date.accessioned2010-11-29-
dc.date.accessioned2011-01-24T10:22:13Z-
dc.date.available2011-01-24T10:22:13Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:hbz:361-13569en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/43760-
dc.description.abstractSince the seminal contribution of Jackson & Wolinsky 1996 [A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks, JET 71, 44-74] it has been widely acknowledged that the formation of social networks exhibits a general conflict between individual strategic behavior and collective outcome. What has not been studied systematically are the sources of inefficiency. We approach this gap by analyzing the role of positive and negative externalities of link formation. We find general results that relate situations of positive externalities with stable networks that cannot be 'too dense' in a well-defined sense, while situations with negative externalities, tend to induce 'too dense' networks.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) |cBielefelden
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x400en
dc.subject.jelD85en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordNetworksen
dc.subject.keywordNetwork formationen
dc.subject.keywordConnectionsen
dc.subject.keywordGame theoryen
dc.subject.keywordExternalitiesen
dc.subject.keywordSpilloversen
dc.subject.keywordStabilityen
dc.subject.keywordEfficiencyen
dc.subject.stwSoziales Netzwerken
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwNetwork Externalitiesen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleUnder-connected and over-connected networks-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn584641079en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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