Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/43478
Authors: 
Forges, Françoise
Orzach, Ram
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di lavoro // Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei: Sustainable development 2010,119
Abstract: 
In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy, Haimanko, Orzach and Sela (Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2002), describe a cooperative game, in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism.
Subjects: 
Auctions
Bayesian game
Collusion
Core
Partition form game
Characteristic function
JEL: 
C71
C72
D44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
305.28 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.