Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43443 
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Nota di Lavoro No. 2010,116
Publisher: 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milano
Abstract: 
This paper extends the theory of endogenous coalition formation, with complete information and transferable utility, to the overlapping case. We propose a cover function bargaining game which allows the formation of overlapping coalitions at equilibrium. We show the existence of subgame perfect equilibrium and provide an algorithm to compute this equilibrium in the symmetric case. As an application, we establish an interesting link with the formation of networks.
Subjects: 
Overlapping Coalitions
Cover Function
Bargaining
Symmetric Game
Network
JEL: 
C71
C72
C78
D62
D85
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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