Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/43261 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CFS Working Paper No. 2008/39
Verlag: 
Goethe University Frankfurt, Center for Financial Studies (CFS), Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a multi-period rational expectations model in which risk-averse investors differ in their information on past transaction prices (the ticker). Some investors (insiders) observe prices in real-time whereas other investors (outsiders) observe prices with a delay. As prices are informative about the asset payoff, insiders get a strictly larger expected utility than outsiders. Yet, information acquisition by one investor exerts a negative externality on other investors. Thus, investors' average welfare is maximal when access to price information is rationed. We show that a market for price information can implement the fraction of insiders that maximizes investors' average welfare. This market features a high price to curb excessive acquisition of ticker information. We also show that informational efficiency is greater when the dissemination of ticker information is broader and more timely.
Schlagwörter: 
Market Data Sales
Latency
Transparency
Price Discovery
Hirshleifer Effect
JEL: 
G10
G12
G14
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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