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dc.contributor.authorFratzscher, Marcelen
dc.contributor.authorReynaud, Julienen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-24-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:19:31Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:19:31Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/39008-
dc.description.abstractThe International Monetary Fund (IMF) is in the process of re-inventing itself with bilateral and multilateral surveillance emerging as a key function. The paper analyses how IMF surveillance announcements may be influenced by political power that member countries exert at the IMF. First, we analyze the content of Article IV Public Information Notices (PIN), and second, we use the financial market reaction to the release PINs as tools to identify the role of political economy factors for IMF surveillance. For a set of emerging market economies, the paper finds that financial markets react more favorable to PIN releases for politically influential member countries. Moreover, IMF surveillance appears to be systematically more favorable for countries with larger IMF loans outstanding, consistent with the finding in the literature that the IMF may engage in 'defensive surveillance'.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3089en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.jelF30en
dc.subject.jelF40en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIMFen
dc.subject.keywordsurveillanceen
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.keywordsovereign spreadsen
dc.subject.keywordfinancial marketsen
dc.subject.keywordemerging market economiesen
dc.subject.stwInternationale Wirtschaftsorganisationen
dc.subject.stwAufsichtsbehördeen
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Informationen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwAnkündigungseffekten
dc.subject.stwBörsenkursen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliche Anleiheen
dc.subject.stwRisikoprämieen
dc.subject.stwZinsstrukturen
dc.subject.stwAufstrebende Märkteen
dc.subject.stwWelten
dc.titleIMF surveillance and financial markets: A political economy analysis-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn630008051en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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