Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38898 
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dc.contributor.authorFurusawa, Taijien
dc.contributor.authorHori, Kazumien
dc.contributor.authorWooton, Ianen
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-01-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:18:00Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:18:00Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38898-
dc.description.abstractWe examine how the bidding environment may affect the outcome of tax competition between two countries (or two regions) in attracting a firm's foreign direct investment (FDI).We compare the equilibrium location choice and payoffs from an English auction, with both complete and incomplete information, relative to those in the traditional setting of a sealed-bid first-price auction. We find that an English auction leads to more aggressive bidding in 'race beyond the bottom,' where the nations may bid beyond their own valuations of the FDI. We also discuss the roles of auction protocol and information asymmetry on the auction outcome.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3049en
dc.subject.jelF12en
dc.subject.jelF23en
dc.subject.jelH25en
dc.subject.jelH73en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtax competitionen
dc.subject.keywordforeign direct investmenten
dc.subject.keywordinternational ownershipen
dc.subject.keywordEnglish auctionen
dc.subject.keywordinformation asymmetryen
dc.subject.stwDirektinvestitionen
dc.subject.stwStandortwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwSteuerwettbewerben
dc.subject.stwStandortpolitiken
dc.subject.stwAuktionstheorieen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleA race beyond the bottom: The nature of bidding for a firm-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn627064302en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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