Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/38874 
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dc.contributor.authorAlbanese, Giuseppeen
dc.contributor.authorSorge, Marco M.en
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-09-
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-18T11:11:46Z-
dc.date.available2010-08-18T11:11:46Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/38874-
dc.description.abstractIn this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence a public decision maker - and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task - with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,23en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD73en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelH11en
dc.subject.jelH49en
dc.subject.jelH77en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIllegal lobbyingen
dc.subject.keywordEndogenous policy makingen
dc.subject.keywordJudicial controlen
dc.subject.stwJustizen
dc.subject.stwRechtsdurchsetzungen
dc.subject.stwInteressenpolitiken
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe role of the judiciary in the public decision making process-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn627600794en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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