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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods No. 2010,23
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper we investigate the role of judicial control of lobbying activities in an endogenous policy framework, focusing on two dimensions of quality of the judiciary, namely efficiency and integrity. We present a multi-layer lobbying model where a self-interested group is allowed to inuence a public decision maker - and possibly the judicial authority itself, which performs an anti-corruption task - with the payment of illegal contributions, and provide general conditions for the existence of a zero-contribution equilibrium. Furthermore, we study how sensitive the main findings are to different institutional arrangements as to judicial independence.
Schlagwörter: 
Illegal lobbying
Endogenous policy making
Judicial control
JEL: 
D72
D73
D78
H11
H49
H77
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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