Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/37192 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Beiträge zur Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik 2010: Ökonomie der Familie - Session: Dynamic Aspects in Optimal Taxation No. F17-V1
Verlag: 
Verein für Socialpolitik, Frankfurt a. M.
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper employs a two-period life-cycle model to derive the optimal tax policy when educational investments are subject to endogenous credit constraints. Credit constraints arise from the limited commitment of creditors to repay loans and from the moral hazard problem due to private information on learning effort and work effort. We show that optimal tax policy differ from that in a similar model with exogenous credit constraints. In particular, if the welfare gain of subsidizing labor income by relaxing credit constraints dominates the welfare loss of increasing borrowing demand, regressive taxation is optimal. The reason is that subsidizing labor income increases the incentive to invest in education and to work, thus mitigating the moral hazard problem adherent to credit for educational investment. Furthermore, we find that no intervention could be optimal even if private capital market is imperfect.
Schlagwörter: 
labor taxation
human capital investment
credit constraints
JEL: 
H21
I28
J00
Dokumentart: 
Conference Paper

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