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dc.contributor.authorAltmann, Steffenen
dc.contributor.authorFalk, Arminen
dc.contributor.authorHuffman, Daviden
dc.date.accessioned2010-06-22-
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-23T09:34:04Z-
dc.date.available2010-07-23T09:34:04Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/36857-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the impact of imperfect contract enforcement on the emergence of unemployment. In an experimental labor market where trading parties can form long-term employment relationships, we compare a work environment where effort is observable, but not verifiable to a situation where explicit contracts are feasible. Our main result shows that unemployment is much higher when third-party contract enforcement is absent. Unemployment is involuntary, being caused by firms' employment and contracting policy. Moreover, we show that implicit contracting can lead to a segmentation of the labor market. Firms in both segments earn similar profits, but workers in the secondary sector face much less favorable conditions than their counterparts in primary-sector jobs.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aInstitute for the Study of Labor (IZA) |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aIZA Discussion Papers |x5001en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelJ64en
dc.subject.jelM55en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIncentivesen
dc.subject.keywordimplicit contractsen
dc.subject.keywordunemploymenten
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.keyworddual labor marketsen
dc.subject.stwTheorie der Arbeitslosigkeiten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsvertragen
dc.subject.stwImplizite Kontrakteen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwGerechtigkeiten
dc.subject.stwDualer Arbeitsmarkten
dc.subject.stwArbeitsbedingungenen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleImplicit contracts, unemployment, and labor market segmentation-
dc.type|aWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn629762724en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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