Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/35691 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 3918
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Despite its lack of attractiveness to other countries, the German system of quasi-parity codetermination at company level has held up remarkably well. We recount the theoretical arguments for and against codetermination and survey the empirical evidence on the effects of the institution, tracing the three phases of a still sparse literature. Recent findings hold out the prospect that good corporate governance might include employee representation by virtue of the monitoring function and the reduction in agency costs, while yet cautioning that the optimal level of representation is likely below parity. And although the German system may be better than its reputation among foreigners, it might have to adapt to globalization and the availability of alternative forms of corporate governance in the EU.
Schlagwörter: 
Codetermination
board-level employee representation
firm performance
Germany
JEL: 
J50
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
201.52 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.