Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/340821 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Series/Report no.: 
ILE Working Paper Series No. 92
Publisher: 
University of Hamburg, Institute of Law and Economics (ILE), Hamburg
Abstract: 
Populism is frequently described as a threat to constitutionalism, although some researchers emphasize that populists, too, draft, enforce, and derive legitimacy from constitutions. This chapter explains the theoretical foundations of these concerns and provides an overview of empirical evidence regarding the relationship between populism and constitutionalism.
Subjects: 
Populism
Constitutional change
Constitutional compliance
Constitutionalism
Judicial independence
Rule of law
JEL: 
D72
D73
K11
K38
K42
P48
Additional Information: 
Contribution prepared for the "Handbook on Economic Populism: A Political Economy Perspective".
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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