Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/339485 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IFS Working Papers No. 25/14
Verlag: 
The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London
Zusammenfassung: 
In UK data, I document the prevalence of misbeliefs regarding the State Pension eligibility age (SPA) and these misbeliefs' predictivity of retirement. Exploiting policy variation, I estimate a lifecycle model of retirement in which rationally inattentive households learning about uncertain pension policy endogenously generates misbeliefs. Endogenous misbeliefs explain 43%-88% of the excessive (given financial incentives) drop in employment at SPA. To achieve this, I develop a solution method for dynamic rational inattention models with history-dependent beliefs. Costly attention makes the SPA up to 15% less effective at increasing old-age employment. Information letters improve welfare and increase employment.
Schlagwörter: 
Rational inattention
Retirement
Misbeliefs
Pensions
Behavioral Macro
Structural Econometrics
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
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