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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2026
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper No. TI 2026-008/VII
Verlag: 
Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam and Rotterdam
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops a micro-founded framework linking price-cost and wage markups to intangible assets. Intangible assets, once created, are a source of firm rents. Owing to limits to enforceable ownership and the non-rival nature of knowledge, these rents can be both retained by the origin firm and transferred to a competitor through poaching of workers. Search and matching frictions affect labor mobility and result in bargaining over rents between the firm and the worker. This environment generates hold-up in intangible asset creation and motivates rent sharing. Under non-compete agreements, poached workers face start delays that weaken outside options. Using microdata from the Netherlands, we document higher price-cost and wage markups in more intangible-intensive firms and lower wages for workers with non-compete agreements, consistent with the model.
Schlagwörter: 
Price-cost markups
wage markups
rent sharing
intangibles
non-compete agreements
JEL: 
J41
L10
O30
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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