Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/338921 
Year of Publication: 
2026
Series/Report no.: 
EconPol Policy Brief No. 80
Publisher: 
CESifo GmbH, Munich
Abstract: 
In response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the European Union (EU) and its allies imposed broad export bans against Russia. Besides exerting economic pressure on the aggressor, a central objective was to cut Russia off from critical technologies needed to produce and maintain military equipment. However, enforcement has proven challenging. Recovered weapons on the battlefield repeatedly contain Western inputs that should have been restricted, raising concerns about the effectiveness of export controls in limiting Russiaʼs military capabilities. This persistence reflects widespread sanctions evasion and the gradual tightening of export controls. Throughout much of 2022 and 2023, many military-relevant products were only partially restricted, allowing exports to continue legally. We use novel, highly granular data to document the gradual tightening of EU export controls on military-relevant goods. Only in January 2024 were all product categories fully sanctioned. Until then, restrictions remained limited in scope, despite being described as an export ban. We then quantify how and to what extent EU-origin military goods continued to reach Russia after the invasion. Sizable flows persisted for nearly two years, first through legally permitted direct exports and later through indirect exports, with goods rerouted via third countries, until tighter enforcement and secondary sanctions substantially curtailed both channels.1 Around one third of indirect exports passed through Türkiye, with much of the remainder routed via China, Hong Kong, and the United Arab Emirates. Overall, we estimate that the export ban raised effective trade costs for EU military goods shipped to Russia by only 19 percent, well below the levels typically implied by an export ban, which would correspond to an infinitely high increase. These patterns point to two broader lessons. First, sanctions were not tight enough from the outset, likely reflecting concerns about protecting European producers. Second, while enforcement eventually shut down all direct exports, curbing the remaining flows will require greater pressure on key hubs for indirect exports, potentially using secondary sanctions. Indeed, stricter enforcement from the beginning of 2024, which also targeted intermediary countries, led to a significant decline in indirect exports.
Document Type: 
Research Report

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