Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336604 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 554
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
In modern information markets, buyers routinely combine signals from multiple sellers. We develop a model of ``portfolio competition'' to analyze this distinctive feature. We show that the combinability of information overturns standard oligopoly intuition. Unlike traditional markets, competitive pressure does not necessarily protect buyers: when signals are complements, sellers can leverage the buyer's desire for the joint portfolio to extract the full social surplus, regardless of the number of competitors. We characterize the precise conditions for rent extraction, which reduce to a simple geometric test for symmetric sellers. Furthermore, we find that the canonical logic of market entry fails. Entry is never socially excessive because efficient portfolio choices eliminate business-stealing effects. Paradoxically, entry can reduce competitive pressure: when entrants provide strong complementarities, they shift the buyer's threat point, allowing all sellers to extract higher rents.
Schlagwörter: 
information markets
portfolio competition
market entry
data economy
complementarity
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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