Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336591 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 541
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We design profit-maximizing mechanisms to sell an excludable and non-rival good with positive and/or negative network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend on how many others also consume the good. In optimum, an endogenous number of the highest types consume the good, and we can implement this allocation in dominant strategies. We apply our insights to digital content creation, and we are able to rationalize features seen in monetization schemes in this industry such as voluntary contributions, community subsidies, and exclusivity bids.
Schlagwörter: 
Mechanism design
non-rival goods
club goods
network effects
digitalcontent
creator economy
JEL: 
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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