Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336591 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 541
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We design profit-maximizing mechanisms to sell an excludable and non-rival good with positive and/or negative network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend on how many others also consume the good. In optimum, an endogenous number of the highest types consume the good, and we can implement this allocation in dominant strategies. We apply our insights to digital content creation, and we are able to rationalize features seen in monetization schemes in this industry such as voluntary contributions, community subsidies, and exclusivity bids.
Subjects: 
Mechanism design
non-rival goods
club goods
network effects
digitalcontent
creator economy
JEL: 
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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