Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336585 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 535
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We study price discrimination by a monopolistic seller that endogenously produces a market segmentation at a cost, and question the efficiency of the production of market segmentations led by private incentives. We show that the efficient market segmentation gives all the gains in total surplus to the buyer, and the seller profit stays at the uniform profit level. Our result suggests that the private production of information by sellers to price discriminate is significantly inefficient.
Subjects: 
Price Discrimination
Cost of Information
Production of Information
JEL: 
D42
D83
L12
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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