Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336567 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 517
Verlag: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider both N-player and mean-field games of optimal portfolio liquidation in which the players are not allowed to change the direction of trading. Players with an initially short position of stocks are only allowed to buy while players with an initially long position are only allowed to sell the stock. Under suitable conditions on the model parameters we show that the games are equivalent to games of timing where the players need to determine the optimal times of market entry and exit. We identify the equilibrium entry and exit times and prove that equilibrium mean-trading rates can be characterized in terms of the solutions to a highly non-linear higher-order integral equation with endogenous terminal condition. We prove the existence of a unique solution to the integral equation from which we obtain the existence of a unique equilibrium both in the mean-field and the N-player game.
Schlagwörter: 
portfolio liquidation
mean-field game
Nash equilibrium
trading constraint
non-linear integral equations
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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