Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/336558 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 508
Publisher: 
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Collaborative Research Center Transregio 190 - Rationality and Competition, München und Berlin
Abstract: 
We suggest a simple method to elicit individual preferences for algorithms. By altering the monetary incentives for ceding control to the algorithm, the menu-based approach allows for measuring, in particular, the degree of algorithm aversion. Using an experiment, we elicit preferences for algorithms in an environment with measurable performance accuracy under two conditionshe absence and the presence of information about the algorithm's performance. Providing such information raises subjects' willingness to rely on algorithms when ceding control to the algorithm is more costly than trusting their own assessment. However, algorithms are still underutilized.
Subjects: 
Algorithm Aversion
Delegation
Experiment
Preferences
JEL: 
C91
D83
D91
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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