Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/335578 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Series/Report no.: 
Law & Economics rRsearch Paper Series No. 20-01
Publisher: 
SSRN, Rochester, NY
Abstract: 
Some recent experimental literature on the taking game (a variation of the dictator game) suggests that human subjects may generally be taking averse, implying that the moral cost of taking exceeds the moral cost of not giving. In our experiment, our subjects could decide to take tangible objects (lottery scratchcards) brought from outside the lab and thus legally owned by other subjects. This legal treatment was compared with a more standard one where subjects earned their scratchcards inside the lab. Evidence is provided of a (weak) taking aversion that is greater when property is established inside the lab via an effort task than when it is pre-existing and legally enforceable outside the lab.
Subjects: 
property rights
taking game
taking aversion
methodology
strict anonymity
earned property rights
real property
free form dictator game
JEL: 
C91
D23
K11
P14
P26
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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