Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33537
Authors: 
Gersbach, Hans
Siemers, Lars-H. R.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 1693
Abstract: 
We examine whether democratic societies can escape poverty traps. Unrestricted agenda setting with simple majority rules fail to educate a society, because education-enhancing redistribution will not occur. We show that a combination of suitable constitutional rules overcomes this impossibility result: rotating agenda setting and agenda repetition in combination with flexible majority rules or with a tax protection rule.
Subjects: 
constitutional design
claims on deductions
flexible majority rules
agenda repetition
poverty traps
child labor
JEL: 
D72
H20
H52
I20
O10
O40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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