Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/334668 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 18253
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Means-tested welfare benefits are usually provided at the household level. Job search effort of unemployed welfare benefit recipients is monitored, and non-compliance with job search requirements can lead to a sanction and therewith to a temporary drop in household income. Among unemployed couples on welfare, a sanction is typically induced by one of the partners but potentially the burden is shared by both. We consider effects of sanctions on their transition rates into work. We examine theoretical implications and provide empirical evidence based on administrative data from Germany. We find that sanctions increase the probability of entering employment for the sanctioned welfare recipient but also for their partner. Females react more strongly to a sanction of their partner than males.
Schlagwörter: 
unemployment
gender
monitoring
job search
social assistance
intra-household bargaining
JEL: 
J64
J65
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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