Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33393
Authors: 
Cigno, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 1797
Abstract: 
The paper re-examines the idea that a family can be viewed as a community governed by a self-enforcing constitution, and extends existing results in two directions. First, it identifies circumstances in which a constitution is renegotiation-proof. Second, it introduces parental altruism. The behavioural and policy implications are illustrated by showing the effects of public pensions and credit rationing. These implications are not much affected by whether altruism is assumed or not, but contrast sharply with the predictions of more conventional models.
Subjects: 
families
self-enforcing constitutions
renegotiation-proofness
altruism
fertility
saving
transfers
attention
pensions
credit rationing
JEL: 
C72
D02
D13
D71
D74
D91
H55
J13
J14
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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