Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/333659 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 18220
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Wage information is rare in job adverts, yet crucial for search. To study this information friction, we run a field experiment with real vacancies, randomly adding or withholding wage information. Disclosing wages does not change average application volumes. Instead, it amplifies the wage elasticity of applications: higher-wage vacancies receive more applicants, while lower-wage vacancies receive fewer. Average applicant quality remains unchanged, challenging standard directed search models. We rationalize the lack of skill-based sorting with two-sided limited information about applicants' skills. We further show that firms' decision not to post wages can act as insurance against unproductive matches.
Subjects: 
vacancy posting
wage posting
information
field experiment
job search
JEL: 
J31
J62
J63
C93
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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