Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/333637 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2025
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 18198
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This study explores the marriage matching of only-child individuals and the related outcomes. Specifically, we analyze two aspects: First, we investigate the marriage patterns of only children, examining whether people choose mates in a positive or negative assortative manner regarding only-child status. We find that, along with being more likely to remain single, only children are more likely to marry another only child. Second, we measure the matching premium or penalty using the difference in partners' socioeconomic status, measured by years of schooling, between only-child and non–only-child individuals. Our estimates show that among women who marry an only-child husband, only children are penalized, as their partners' educational attainment is 0.63 years lower. Finally, we discuss the potential sources of this penalty along with our empirical findings.
Schlagwörter: 
marriage matching
only children
gender
machine learning
JEL: 
J11
J12
J16
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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