Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/33276
Authors: 
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.
Bowles, Samuel
Gintis, Herbert
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers 2106
Abstract: 
Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information concerning the behavior of each player. We provide a model of team production in which the effectiveness of mutual monitoring depends not on these factors, but rather on strong reciprocity: the willingness of some team members to engage in the costly punishment of shirkers. This alternative does not require small group size or public signals. An experimental public goods game provides evidence for the behavioral relevance of strong reciprocity in teams.
Subjects: 
team production
public good
monitoring
punishment
experiment
JEL: 
C92
H41
J41
J54
Z13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
305.68 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.