Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330226 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Dynamic Games and Applications [ISSN:] 2153-0793 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 5 [Publisher:] Springer US [Place:] New York, NY [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1646-1684
Publisher: 
Springer US, New York, NY
Abstract: 
We study the behavior of dynamic equilibria in mean field games with large time horizons in a dynamic consumer choice model. We show that if the stationary equilibrium in the associated infinite horizon game is unique, the dynamic equilibria of the finite horizon games converge to the stationary equilibrium of the infinite horizon game as the time horizon tends to infinity. If the stationary equilibrium is not unique, however, the situation becomes more involved. In this case, we show that in addition to convergence to the stationary equilibria, in the long run, the dynamic equilibria circle around randomized stationary equilibria for certain choices of boundary data.
Subjects: 
Mean field game
Dynamic equilibrium
Stationary equilibrium
Turnpike property
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Published Version

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