Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330137 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 23 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 1-7
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This paper develops a simple model of sequel production for experience goods, showing how reputation shapes a producer's incentives. Producers differ in productivity, which determines how much effort they invest. A sequel is made only if the previous installment exceeds a quality threshold, capturing the idea that consumers base future consumption on past success. Although high-productivity producers create higher-quality originals and sequels, the conditioning on successful originals still makes sequels, on average, worse than their predecessors. This aligns with evidence of sequel underperformance in media markets.
Subjects: 
sequel
reputation
experience goods
producer incentives
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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