Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330129 
Year of Publication: 
2025
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 16 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 15 [Year:] 2025 [Pages:] 1-8
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This paper studies biased-manager hiring in a market with network externalities and product compatibility. We show that the aggressivity of a biased manager has a non-linear relationship with product compatibility; however, since both owners want to hire aggressive managers, product compatibility is irrelevant to the type of manager the owner hires. In Cournot competition, product compatibility is crucial in alleviating the 'prisoner’s dilemma' due to the net network effect of network externalities with product compatibility. In Bertrand competition, the 'prisoner’s dilemma' is resolved when the augmented net network effect of product compatibility is large.
Subjects: 
network externalities
product compatibility
biased manager
Bertrand
Cournot
JEL: 
D43
L13
L14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article
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