Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330101 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 5 [Article No.:] 32 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-13
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
This paper examines the tactical interaction between drones and tanks in modern warfare through game theory, particularly focusing on Stackelberg equilibrium and backward induction. It describes a high-stakes conflict between two teams: one using advanced drones for attack, and the other defending using tanks. The paper conceptualizes this as a sequential game, illustrating the complex strategic dynamics similar to Stackelberg competition, where moves and countermoves are carefully analyzed and predicted.
Subjects: 
Stackelberg equilibrium
sequential games
backwards-induction outcome
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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