Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330100 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 5 [Article No.:] 31 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-17
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
I consider a class of dynamic Bayesian games in which types evolve stochastically according to a first-order Markov process on a continuous type space. Types are privately informed, but they become public together with actions when payoffs are obtained, resulting in a delayed information revelation. In this environment, I show that there exists a stationary Bayesian-Markov equilibrium in which a player's strategy maps a tuple of the previous type and action profiles and the player's current type to a mixed action. The existence can be extended to K-periodic revelation. I also offer a computational algorithm to find an equilibrium.
Subjects: 
Bayesian game
stochastic game
existence
stationary Markov equilibrium
periodic revelation
JEL: 
C62
C73
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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