Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330095 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 4 [Article No.:] 26 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-11
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Auctions are a prevalent way to exchange goods and are well-studied for the exchange of rivalrous goods, but are less studied for non-rivalrous goods. I examine an auction framework where the good sold can be used simultaneously by multiple bidders if their use does not conflict with others; this simultaneous use directly affects the efficiency of the auction. A timely example includes the auctioning off of a radio spectrum by a licensed primary user to unlicensed secondary users who can use the spectrum simultaneously if they are located far enough apart to not cause interference. I examine a uniform price auction over non-conflicting groups and examine how non-rivalry impacts both efficiency and collusion. Conditions are given under which an auction over groups generates higher social welfare than an individual auction. Additional conditions are given under which collusion in a group auction results in higher prices.
Subjects: 
auction
collusion
non-rivalrous good
JEL: 
D44
L14
C7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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