Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330090 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 21 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-7
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In this paper, we aim to investigate the collusive stability in the presence of network externalities among firms with relative performance in the firm's objective functions. We demonstrate that collusive stability is increasing (decreasing) in the degree of relative performance, product substitutability and network effect when the network effect is sufficiently large (small). A competition agency might need to provide different guidance for anti-competitive regulation in the network industry.
Subjects: 
network externalities
relative performance
stability of collusion
JEL: 
D43
O34
L13
L41
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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