Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330086 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 17 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-14
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
We provide sufficient conditions on the primitives of a class of discontinuous Bayesian games such that all games in the class share equilibria. If a Bayesian game in the class also satisfies a weak efficiency condition, then we show its normal form is better-reply secure. The invariance property then provides an existence result for all Bayesian games in the class. Results are shown for both pure strategy and behavioral strategy equilibrium. We illustrate the application of the results with an example of a class of contests with bid caps.
Subjects: 
discontinuous Bayesian game
equilibrium existence
invariance
random superior payoff matching
random weak efficiency
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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