Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330085 
Year of Publication: 
2024
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 16 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-15
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Paying it forward' is a behavior in which people help someone else because they were helped in the past. Although experimental evidence exists that indicates that real human beings often 'pay-it-forward' even in the face of free-rider risks, the theoretical basis for the evolution of this behavior remains unclear. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical model that explains how pay-it-forward behavior can evolve despite the temptation to free-ride. By assuming that human beings exhibit cognitive distortions, as predicted by prospect theory, and that free-riding is punished with a tiny probability, we demonstrate that pay-it-forward, alongside unconditional altruistic behavior, can evolve and effectively deter free-riding behavior.
Subjects: 
cooperation
evolutionary game theory
expected utility theory
pay-it-forward
prospect theory
punishment
social dilemma
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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