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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2024
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 2 [Article No.:] 11 [Year:] 2024 [Pages:] 1-38
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
A variety of empirical papers document the coexistence of exclusive and nonexclusive contracts within a given market across a multitude of industries. However, the theoretical literature has not been able to generate a differentiable model with the coexistence of these contracts. I rectify the gap in the literature by developing a theoretical model of two-sided matching, in which principals and agents choose between exclusive and nonexclusive contracts with cost-of-effort inefficiencies. I find that the coexistence of contracts relies on cost-sharing between principals, relative bargaining power, and an endogenous outside option. I also find that the pattern of contracts is monotonic with respect to the type distributions of principals and agents.
Schlagwörter: 
contract theory
organizational economics
two-sided matching
JEL: 
C78
D86
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