Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/330040 
Year of Publication: 
2023
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 3 [Article No.:] 47 [Year:] 2023 [Pages:] 1-14
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one of the N possible elements of a partition to the mediator and then the mediator suggests one of the N actions to the uninformed decision-maker according to the probability distribution of the device. We show that no such simple mediated equilibrium can improve upon the unmediated N-partition Crawford-Sobel equilibrium when the preference divergence parameter (bias) is small.
Subjects: 
cheap talk
mediated equilibrium
JEL: 
C72
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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